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Abstract
Intellectual property (“IP”) is often credited with providing an incentive for inventors to develop their creativity. Through IP protection, inventors can recoup their investment and make a
profit. That idea, which has inspired legislators worldwide, is currently challenged in the European case law on competition. In the last twenty years, five cases have limited, in the name
of competition, the possibility for firms to use IP rights acquired in conformity with applicable
laws. These cases are examined in this article. I analyze the scope of the emerging jurisprudence
and investigate the arguments articulated, in support of their position, by the European instances
involved.

THE LIMITATION OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY IN THE NAME OF COMPETITION
Paul Nihoul*
INTRODUCTION
Intellectual property ("IP") is often credited with providing
an incentive for inventors to develop their creativity. Through
IP protection, inventors can recoup their investment and make a
profit.' That idea, which has inspired legislators worldwide, 2 is
currently challenged in the European case law on competition.
In the last twenty years, five cases have limited, in the name of
competition, the possibility for firms to use IP rights acquired in
conformity with applicable laws. These cases are examined in
this Article. We analyze the scope of the emerging jurisprudence, and we investigate the arguments articulated, in support
of their position, by the European instances involved.
I. CASE LAW
A. Volvo, Renault3
The case law on the limitation of IP in the name of competition emerged in the 1980s in two preliminary rulings delivered
by the European Court of Justice ("ECJ" or "Court"). These
cases involved the car constructors Volvo and Renault, which
had set aside demands for licenses concerning body panels
* License in Law (Louvain), LL.M. (Harvard), Doctorate in Law (Louvain), Professor of Law (Louvain, Belgium, and Groningen, the Netherlands).
1. See, e.g., ROBERT P. MERGERS & JANE C. GINSBURG, FOUNDATIONS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2004); MICHAEL SPENCE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2007). With a more
critical tone, cf WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (2003). On the relation between Intellectual Property
("IP") and competition law, see THE INTERFACE BETWEEN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS AND COMPETITION POLICY (Steven D. Andeman ed., 2007); EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW ANNUAL 2005:

THE INTERACTION BETWEEN COMPETITION LAW AND INTELLEC-

& Isabela Atanasiu eds., 2006);JONATHAN
D. C. TURNER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND EU COMPETITION LAW (2008).
2. For a European perspective, see generally Guy TRITrON, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN EUROPE (2008); TREVOR COOK, EU INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2007).
3. AB Volvo v. Erik Veng (UK), Case 238/87, [1988] E.C.R. 6211; Consorzio
Italiano Della Componentistica Di Ricambio Per Autoveicoli v. R6gie Nationale Des
Usines Renault, Case 53/87, [1988] E.C.R. 6039 [hereinafter Renault]. These
judgments contain in substance the same principles. In this Article, we mainly refer to
the former.
TUAL PROPERTY LAW (Claus-Dieter Ehlermann
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meant for their cars. If they had accepted these demands, the
body panels would have been produced or imported from other
Member States by third parties. 4 The constructors held design
protections on these panels. Panels of other designs could not
be used.5 The case was decided along the following principles:
Principle 1: IP cannot be deemed, as such, incompatible with
the rules of competition. Otherwise, the whole system of pro-'
tection of inventions would fall apart.
Principle 2: Despite the compatibility of IP and the rules of
competition in principle, the use made of IP must be scrutinized under Article 82 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community ("EC"), which prohibits abuses committed
by dominant firms.6
Principle 3: Article 82 EC entails a prohibition, in that context, of IP related behavior, (a) adopted by dominant firms,
(b) in exceptional circumstances. 7
These principles have appeared in all subsequent cases on the
subject matter.' In these cases, the ECJ, the Court of First Instance ("CFI"), and the European Commission, systematically
started their opinions by stating that their intention was not to
challenge IP as such-but to carry out a limited control on behavior adopted by dominant firms in exceptional circumstances. 9
In Volvo and Renault, the ECJ provided examples on how
4. Volvo, [1988] E.C.R. 6211; Renault, [1988] E.C.R. 6039.
5. Volvo, [1988] E.C.R. 6211; Renault, [1988] E.C.R. 6039.
6. In this Article, we do not consider the application of Article 81 of the Treaty
Establishing the European Community ("EC") to licensing agreements. Consolidated
Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, art. 81 OJ. C 321 E/37 at
73-74 (2006) [hereinafter EC Treaty]. On the application of Article 81 (3) EC to categories of technology transfer agreements, see Commission Regulation No. 772/2004, OJ.
L 123/11 (2004); Commission Notice, OJ. C 101/2 (2004). On exemptions, see generallyJ.HJ. Bourgeois and Jan Bocken, Guidelines on the Application of Article 81(3) of the EC
Treaty or How to Restrict a Restriction, 32 LEGAL I.E.I. 111-21 (2005).
7. See generally Volvo, [1988] E.C.R. 6211; Renault, [1988] E.C.R. 6039.
8. See, e.g., Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston, The Wellcome Foundation v.
Paranova Pharmazeutika Handels GmbH, Case C-276/05 (ECJ, delivered Oct. 9, 2008)
(Court decision not yet issued); UNION FRANCAISE DE L'EXPRESS (UFEX) v. COMMISSION,
CASE T-60/05, [2007] E.C.R. 3397; SGL Carbon AG v. Commission, Case T-68/04 (CFI
Oct. 8, 2008) (not yet reported).
9. See, e.g., Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston, The Wellcome Foundation v.
Paranova Pharmazeutika Handels GmbH, Case C-276/05 (ECJ, delivered Oct. 9, 2008)
(Court decision not yet issued); UNION FRANCAISE DE L'EXPRESS (UFEX) V. COMMISSION,

CASE T-60/05, [2007] E.C.R. 3397; SGL Carbon AG v. Commission, Case T-68/04 (CFI
Oct. 8, 2008) (not yet reported).
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Principle 3 above could be implemented.' For the jurisdiction,
exceptional circumstances are present where a dominant firm
arbitrarily refuses to grant a license, where it imposes unfair royalties or where it discontinues production despite the existence
of demand. The ECJ presented these situations as indicative.
Other circumstances may thus be found exceptional. Of the circumstances mentioned in the rulings, the first one has come
back in all IP/competition cases. These cases typically feature a
dominant firm refusing to grant a license demanded by a third
party.
B. Magill"
In the 1990s, the relationship between IP and competition
was discussed again. This time, the problem gave rise to a decision by the European Commission, a CFI judgment and, on appeal, an ECJ ruling.12 The case featured three broadcasting
companies1" opposing the publication, by a third party, 4 of listings containing copyright protected information on their television ("TV") programs. Together, they dominated the markets
for TV information in Ireland.' 5 Their behavior was found abusive under Article 82 EC. 6 No justification was accepted. The
Commission, the CFI, and the ECJ reiterated the principles mentioned above: compatibility of IP in principle, control on the use
made of it, and prohibition of behavior adopted by dominant
firms in exceptional circumstances. 7
10. See generally Volvo, [1988] E.C.R. 6211; Renault, [1988] E.C.R. 6039.
11. See Commission Decision No. 89/205/EEC, O.J. L 78/43 (1988) [hereinafter
Magill]; Radio Telefis Eireann RTE v. Commission, Case T-69/89, [1991] E.C.R. 485
[hereinafter RTE]; Independent Television Publications Ltd v. Commission, Case T-76/
89, [1991] E.C.R. 575; see also Radio Telefis Eireann (RTE) v. Commission,Joined Cases
241-42/91, [1995] E.C.R. 743 [hereinafter RTE I1]. These cases are similar. Id. For
that reason, we mainly refer, in this Article, to the Radio Telefis Eireann RTE v.
Commission ("RTE') judgment. See generally Thomas C. Vinje, The Final Word on Magill:
TheJudgment of the ECJ, E.I.P.R. 1995, 17(6), 297-303; Simon M. Taylor, Copyright versus
Right to Compete: The Judgment of the ECJ in Magill, C.T.L.R. 1995, 1(3), 99-102.
12. See generally Magill, O.J. L. 78/43 (1988), RTE [1991] E.C.R. 485, RTE II,
[1995] E.C.R. 743.
13. The British Broadcasting Corporation ("BBC"), Independent Television Publications Limited ("TrP"), and Radio Telefis Eireann ("RTE").
14. Magill TV Guide Limited.
15. The geographic market included the northern part of the island. The product
markets deemed relevant in the case are identified infra.
16. Magill, OJ. L. 78/43, at 23 (1988).
17. See generally Vinje, supra note 11.
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A striking feature is that, in addition to reiterating these
principles, the said institutions further explained and motivated
their position. After that case, the principle of an intervention
was thus established together with its justifications. Discussions
would still arise afterwards-they would remain limited to the
content of conditions to satisfy.
Justification 1: The broadcasters infringed Article 82 EC because they dominated the primary markets for TV listings and
used that domination to protect derived activities on the market for (weekly) publications.
Justification 2: Article 82 EC was also violated because, with
their behavior, the broadcasters prevented the emergence of
a new product. Had an authorization been granted, a weekly
comprehensive TV guide could have been published."8
Justification 3: The broadcasters used their dominant position to avoid competition with third parties on the market for
weekly, comprehensive TV guides.
Justification 4: With their refusal, the 19broadcasters created a
situation not favorable for consumers.
20

C. IMS Health

In IMS Health, a German firm (IMS Health) was selling
health related data to pharmacies and doctors' practices in Germany. 2 ' To that effect, it had developed a "brick structure "22
18. The case arose because an independent firm started the publication of a comprehensive guide containing protected information. The broadcasters initiated proceedings before national courts. A complaint was lodged by the independent firm to
the European Commission which, in a decision, compelled the broadcasters to authorize the publication. Magill, O.J. L. 78/43, at 23 (1988). The validity of the decision was
challenged before the Court of First Instance ("CFI"). RTE, Case T-69/89, [1991]
E.C.R. 485, 1. The CFI judgment was appealed before the European Court ofJustice
("ECJ"). See generally RTE II, Joined Cases 241-42/91, [1995] E.C.R. 743.
19. See Magill, O.J. L. 78/43, at 23 (1988).
20. IMS Health & Co. OHG v. NDC Health GmbH & Co. KG, Case 418/01, [2004]
E.C.R. 5039 [hereinafter IMS Health]; see also Indigo Brinker, Essential Facility Doctrine
and Intellectual Property law: Where Does Europe Stand in the Aftermath of'IMS Health' Case?,
in 31 ANNUAL PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORDHAM CORPORATE LAW INSTITUTE 137-50 (2004);

Henrik Meinberg, From Magill to IMS Health: The New Product Requirement and the
Diversity ofIntellectual PropertyRights, E.I.P.R. 2006, 28(7), 398-403; Christopher Stothers,
IMS Health and its Implicationsfor Compulsory Licensing in Europe, E.I.P.R. 2004, 26(10),
467-72.
2-6.
21. IMS Health, [2004] E.C.R. 5039,
22. Id. 4. These bricks were created by taking into account various criteria such
as municipality boundaries, postcodes, population density, transport connections, the
geographical distribution of pharmacies, and doctors' practices.
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which, in the course of time, had become an industry standard.
As a result of the common use of that structure, the firm held a
de facto monopoly over the relevant market. 2 That position was
challenged when a former collaborator started to sell data using
the brick structure developed by the dominant firm.2 4
The case arrived at the ECJ through preliminary questions.
In the ruling, the ECJ further delineated two conditions for the
application of the legal standard. First, it ruled that Article 82
EC would apply in IP cases if two markets were involved. For the
ECJ, access obligations may only be imposed where IP protected
products are "indispensable" for the provision of other, related
ones. 25 Second, the ECJ emphasized that no obligation may be
imposed where the third party would "essentially... duplicate"
products provided by the dominant firm. 26 Access orders should
be limited to circumstances where "new" products are proposed.2 7

IMS Health was perceived as an indication of the desire, on
the part of the ECJ, to limit the scope of the jurisprudence.28
Henceforth, third parties would have to fulfill an additional condition before the prohibition contained in Article 82 EC could
be applied. They would have to establish that, as a result of a
behavior adopted by an IP dominant firm, the emergence of a
new product meeting an existing demand would be prevented.
D. Microsoft
Microsoft is the last case to date where the problem of the
relationship between IP and competition was raised. The case
23. See id. 12
24. Id. 7.
25. Id. 22. On that point, the ECJ refers to its judgment of November 26, 1998 in
Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co. KG v. Mediaprint Zeitungs-und Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH &
Co., Case 7/97, [1998] E.C.R. 7791. That case does not concern IP but relates to the
distribution of an independent newspaper through a network operated by the owner of
a competing newspaper. On that ruling, see Pat Treacy, EssentialFacilities-Is the Tide
Turning?, E.C.L.R. 1998, 19(8) 501-05; Leigh Hancher, Case C-7/97, Oscar Bronner
GmbH & Co. KG v. Mediaprint Zeitungs-und Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co., 36
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1289, 1289-1307 (1999).

26. IMS Health, [2004] E.C.R. 5039, 49.
27. Id. 52.
28. See generally Brinker, supra note 20; Meinberg, supra note 20; Stothers, supra
note 20; see also European Commission, DG Competition Discussion Paperon the Application
of Article 82 of the Treaty to Exclusionary Abuses, 239 (Dec. 2005), availableat http://ec.
europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/art82/discpaper2005.pdf.
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arose from complaints made by competitors. First, the U.S. firm
Microsoft had refused to divulge information necessary for the
development of work group server operating systems. 29 That refusal had made it impossible to develop competing operating systems. Second, Microsoft had integrated its multimedia
software 30 in its client Personal Computer ("PC") operating system Windows. As a result of that integration, other multimedia
software producers could not effectively propose their products
to final users.
In this Article, we focus on the first allegation. The question was whether and, if so, to what extent a dominant firm may
withhold IP protected information indispensable for the development of fully compatible derived products. Microsoft was
found dominant on the worldwide market for client PC operating systems. 31 This resulted from the share held by the firm on
that market-more than ninety percent. 32 It also derived from
the existence of a strong barrier to entry, the "positive feedback
loop"-a mechanism whereby firms develop applications by reference to the standard operating system, thereby reinforcing
that system even more. 3
Microsoft was also found dominant on the market for work
group server ("WGS") operating systems. A WGS delivers collective services to members of communities. 34 As with other electronic equipment, they run on an operating system to which applications are added.3 5 Originally, WGS operating systems were
developed by other firms.36 Microsoft took interest in the market. Rapidly, the product made by Microsoft gained importance.
This was due, among other things, to interoperability information. First, interoperability information regarding Windows was
kept confidential. 7 Thus, competitors could not manufacture
29. See Commission Decision of 24 March 2004, Case COMP/C-3/37.792, at 147209, available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/decisions/37792/
en.pdf [hereinafter Microsoft Decision].
30. Windows Multimedia.
31. See Microsoft Decision, Case COMP/C-3/37.792, at 118-46.
32. Id. at 119-20.
33. Id. at 235-36.
34. File sharing, access to collective printers, etc.
35. See Microsoft Decision, Case COMP/C-3/37.792, at 18-20.
36. Id. at 158.
37. Windows is the client PC operating system manufactured by Microsoft. That
operating system is widely used in worldwide markets-with more than a ninety percent
market share.
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WGS operating systems fully interoperable and compatible with
the standard client PC operating system made by Microsoft. 8
Second, Microsoft also kept confidential interoperability information on its WGS operating system.3 9 Competitors could still
propose alternative products. But these systems had to be compatible with the WGS made by Microsoft as that product was becoming the reference. This was impossible as essential interoperability information was kept confidential.
These findings were made in a decision adopted by the European Commission.4" They were confirmed by the CFI before
which the validity of the decision was challenged. 4 No appeal
was lodged with the ECJ which, as a result, could not close the
debate .42
II. THE SCOPE OF THE JURISPRUDENC

The cases examined above introduce a control on the use
made of IP rights in certain situations. Some formulations used
by the European courts may create an impression that control
has a marginal importance. On the contrary, our feeling is that
jurisprudence may have a significant influence on markets.
A. What Rights?
A first question involves the rights concerned. In that re38. Collective equipment only works properly in a community if it can communicate with the PCs held by the members of that community. The adaptation of that
collective equipment to client PCs is only possible to the extent developers have access
to information on the protocols used by PCs for their communications (this is known as
interoperability information).
39. See Microsoft Decision, Case COMP/C-3/37.792, at 147-56.
40. See id.
41. See generally, Microsoft Corp. v. Commission, Case T-201/04, [2007] 5 C.M.L.R.
11; see also David Howarth and Kathryn McMahon, Windows has Performed an Illegal Operation: the Court of First Instance'sJudgment in Microsoft v. Commission, 29 EUR. COMM. L.
REv. 117-34 (2008); Maria Montagnani, Remedies to Exclusionary Innovation in the HighTech Sector-Is There a Lesson From the Microsoft Saga, 30 WORLD COMPETITION:

L. &

ECON. L. REv. 623-43 (2007).
42. Other decisions were taken by the European Commission in the Microsoft case.
They concern the implementation of the remedies imposed by the European Commission on Microsoft on the basis of the findings presented here. Orders were also
adopted by the President of the Court of First Instance ("CFI") regarding applications
made by Microsoft to obtain a suspension of the decisions taken by the Commission
during the procedure leading to ajudgment on the substance of the case. These decisions and orders can be found on the internet site of the European Commission. European Commission, http://ec.europa.eu/index-en.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2008).
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gard, we must emphasize that the jurisprudence has a general
application. The cases feature some IP rights-design protection,43 and copyright.4 4 But all IP regimes are concerned at least
potentially. This results from the broad terms used in the jurisprudence. From these terms, one can gather that the jurisprudence affects all regimes under which firms are entitled to oppose the use by third parties of protected items, whatever the
name of the regime, the specificity of the rules concerned, or
the authority by which these rules were adopted (national or European courts).
B. What Firms?
The second question regards the undertakings affected pursuant to the decisions and judgments. The jurisprudence is limited to dominant firms. This may create an impression that a
very limited number of undertakings are affected. In our view,
that impression would have to be nuanced. Dominance is an
empty concept in itself. Its application is not limited to gigantic
firms like Microsoft. Depending on market definition, the concept can be used in connection with small undertakings.
Thus, how were relevant markets defined in the jurisprudence analyzed here? In Volvo, 45 different definitions seemed
possible. One definition could encompass all vehicles belonging
to the category of cars involved. A second definition: the spare
parts used in these vehicles. A third possibility: the spare parts
used on the specific models involved in the cases. A still narrower approach was finally chosen by the ECJ which, in its judgment, limited the market to the body panels at the very heart of
the dispute.4 6 With the market so defined, only one firm was
engaged in that activity: the car constructor concerned.4 7
The same occurred in Magill, where the broadcasters argued that the market extended to all TV publications and even
included broadcasting activities." But a narrower perspective
was adopted. Ultimately, the listings prepared by each broad43. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
44. See supra notes 11, 20, 29 and accompanying text.
45. The same analysis can be undertaken in the case of Renault, Case 53/87,
[1988] E.C.R. 6039.
46. SeeAB Volvo v. Erik Veng (UK), Case 238/87, [1988] E.C.R. 6211, 9.
47. See id.

48. Magill, [1991] E.C.R. 575,

15-18.
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caster were defined as forming separate, primary markets.4 9 As
in Volvo and Renault, the markets thus corresponded with the IP
protected products. On each of these markets, there was, by
force of circumstance, one firm only-the author of the listings
concerned.
The same analysis can be used for IMS Health. A firm had
developed a brick structure to commercialize health data. That
structure was protected by copyrights. 50 The market could be
defined as covering all health related services-or even all
databases used for commercial purposes in the relevant geographic market.5 1 Once more, the definition was limited to the
specific IP protected product involved in the case: the brick
structure.5 2 On that market, there was, again, one participant
only.
It appears from this discussion that the European courts define markets narrowly in IP/competition cases. In each case, the
definition is limited to the protected product.5 31 When the market is so defined, IP firms are found dominant. In that context,
dominance is not a feature reserved to important firms. Rather,
it depends upon the existence of an innovation. With the attitude adopted by the European courts regarding market definition, firms are likely to be found dominant, whatever their size,
where they innovate and their innovations are IP-protected.
C. What Behavior?
The third question regards scope: are many practices affected by the jurisprudence? For Article 82 EC5 4 to apply, dominance is not sufficient-an abuse must be committed. How
should that second condition be interpreted in our context? Lit49. See id. 25.
50. IMS Health, [2004] E.C.R. 5039, J 9-11.
51. Id.
3-4.
52. Before the ECJ, there was an intense debate on that issue. Could the brick
structure be dissociated from the sales of data? Could the form be envisaged without
the content? A positive answer was necessary to apply the case law. Under the jurisprudence, IP related access obligations are limited to situations involving two marketsone for the primary substance and the other for the derived product. To avoid that
positive answer, IMS Health contended that the case involved one market only: the
competitor, it argued, intended to supply an almost identical product on the same market. See id. 32.
53. See supra notes 44-53 and accompanying text.
54. EC Treaty, supra note 7, art. 82, O.J. C 321 E/37 at 74-75.
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tie indication can be found on that issue in Volvo or Renault.
These cases concerned refusals by car constructors to grant licenses. The ECJ ruled that such practices infringe Article 82 EC
where they are "abusive"-without explaining under what conditions the practices became abusive.5 5 The cases also involved
royalties to be paid in counterpart for licenses. The ECJ ruled
that a violation would take place if those royalties were "unfair."56 Again, it did not provide any indication as to the circumstances under which royalties may become unfair.
Considering the practices involved in these cases, one has
the impression that they would be deemed normal on ordinary
markets. Consider a refusal to grant licenses. IP licenses are
often granted on exclusive bases. Licensees are granted exclusive rights to exploit innovations in given territories. Suppose an
environment where IP firms are compelled to grant licenses to
all interested parties. In such an environment, innovations
would be exploited in competition. Facing competition, licenses
would collect fewer revenues. As they obtain little, they would
not invest much in the exploitation. Finally, they would show
little interest in the activity. It would become difficult, for innovators, to find licensees. The incentive to innovate would diminish. This would result in less innovation-with negative results
57
for society.
Later cases (Magill, IMS Health, and Microsoft) provide indications on why IP practices apparently normal on ordinary markets transform into abuses in exceptional circumstances. These
circumstances correspond to the considerations formulated by
the European instances to explain their interventions. 51 In substance, the justifications focus on the effects produced by challenged practices on secondary markets.
" Creation, on a secondary market, of an environment
where firms do not compete on the merits as a result of a
dominance acquired by one of them on a primary mar59
ket.
" In the absence of effective competition on that secondary
9.
55. SeeAB Volvo v. Erik Veng (UK), Case 238/87, [1988] E.C.R. 6211,
56. See id.
57. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
58. These justifications were presented in Part I, supra and are analyzed in Part III,
infra. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
59. Justification 3.
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market, possibility, for the firm dominating the primary
market, to extend that domination to the former.6 °
As a result, creation, on that secondary market, of a situation not favorable for consumers:
limitation of technical
62
6
development, ' high prices.

As appears from these terms, IP practices may "turn" abusive
whatever they are, where they have undesirable effects, as regards competition, on derived markets. What is prohibited is the
extension of dominance where that extension is based on IP
practices, independent of the behavior whereby that extension
takes places. All IP practices are thus concerned by the jurisprudence-the only condition being that they must have undesirable effects on competition on derived markets.
D. Wat Control?
The fourth questions asks: what control is carried out in the
name of competition? In their decisions and judgments, the European instances insist that IP is not illegal per se. Their intervention is presented as limited to a control on the use made of that
property in specific circumstances. Yet, can rights be distinguished from the use that is made of them-and vice versa?
Generally speaking, rights entail a permission to legally accomplish certain acts, the identity of which depends on the
rights concerned. Suppose that certain actions normally permissible under these rights fall under a prohibition as a result of the
application of another rule. Would the rights be affected in
themselves-or only the use that can be made of them? In our
view, both would be affected. As a result of the application of
the prohibition, the substance of the right would be attained.
The object of that right-the type/number of permissible actions-would be more limited than before.
In that context, the substance of the jurisprudence could
better be reformulated. In our view, that jurisprudence goes beyond a control on the use made of IP in certain circumstances.
It determines conditions under which, for the European instances, the substance of IP should be limited, in the name of
competition. These instances consider that, in certain situa60. Justification 1: leverage of a dominant position ("LDP") requirement.
61. Justification 2: new product requirement ("NP").
62. Justification 4.
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tions, innovation would better develop through competition.
The cases modify the line established under IP legislation to determine the situations where innovation deserves protection.
E.

Mhat Obligation(s)?

The last question is how compelling are the obligations imposed on dominant IP firms in the name of competition? On
that point, the impression of a limited scope sometimes conveyed by the jurisprudence is in sharp contrast with the reactions
formulated by the firms involved.6 3 In practice, access obligations are experienced as emptying IP rights of their substance.
IP is regulated at a national and/or European level. Beyond possible divergences, a common feature, across regimes, is that IP
rights entail an exclusivity.6 4 If they so wish, IP owners may remain the only undertakings using a protected item.65 Other usages may be authorized-only if IP owners decide so. 6 6 Even in
that context, IP owners retain a form of exclusivity. They remain
the only ones entitled to determine what usages are legitimate.
They can also determine the terms and conditions applicable to
their licenses.
In most instances, being the only one authorized to use a
protected item affects the exercise of activities on the relevant
market.6 7 In certain cases, a project may be ruined by the presence of a second firm proposing the same product. In reaction,
the jurisprudence emphasizes that fees may be claimed for the
usage of protected items.6 8 As the value of the advantage is compensated financially, firms would not be deprived totally of their
rights. However, this does not take into account the application
of competition law on the terms/conditions applicable to compelled access. The issue was addressed in Magill, where the
broadcasters were ordered to present to the Commission, for
verification, within two months, the terms and conditions pro63. In Microsoft Corp. v. Commission, the U.S. firm contended that the access ordered by the Commission would deprive its innovations of their value. The firm would
lose all incentives to innovate. See Microsoft Corp. v. Commission, Case T-201/04,
[2007] 5 C.M.L.R. 11, 9 274, 689.
64. Id. 691.
65. Id.
66. Id. 691, 696.
67. Id. 691.
68. Id. 117.
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posed for access.6 9 It gave rise to substantial developments in
Microsoft, where a monitoring trustee was appointed to ensure
compliance. 0 In substance, a firm compelled to grant access
must apply reasonable terms and conditions. These terms and
conditions may not be less favorable than those proposed by the
firm, within its own organization, to the department(s) or subsidiary(ies) in charge of the same activity. That idea was expressed in various cases involving the application of Article 82
EC. v" It has inspired EC public utility regulation, where compa7 2
rable obligations are imposed on network operators.
III. JUSTIFICATIONS
A. Leverage of a Dominant Position
We have examined the case law-and analyzed its scope.
We turn to the justifications advanced by the European instances
to explain their intervention. A first justification is that firms
should not be permitted to leverage a domination to support
activities on derived markets (Leverage of a Dominant Position,
"LDP"). That prohibition is not specific to IP. It was applied in
other economic activities." The leading case, on that point, is
Commercial Solvents."4 In that case, firms were involved in a busi-

ness chain for the fabrication of an anti tuberculosis drug.75
That chain contained various stages corresponding to the successive transformations of products. On market for product 1
69. RTE, Case T-69/89, [1991] E.C.R. 485,
14.
70. Microsoft Corp. v. Commission, Case T-201/04, [2007] 5 C.M.L.R. 11,
50,
83, 1235.
71. See generally PAUL NIHOUL & PETER RODFORD, EU ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS-COMPETITION AND REGULATION IN THE EUROPEAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS MARKET

343-491 (2004).
72. See id. at 175-343.
73. See generally JURIAN LANGER, TYING AND BUNDLING AS A LEVERAGING CONCERN
UNDER EC COMPETITION LAW (2007); see also Ivo VAN BAEL & JEAN-FRANCOIs BELLIS,
COMPETITION LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 962-68 (4th ed. 2005); Francois Lveque, Innovation, Leveraging and Essential Facilities: Interoperability Licensing in the EU
Microsoft Case, 28 WORLD COMPETITION (2005), 71-91; Kai-Uwe Kahn, Robert Stillman
& Christina Caffarra, Economic Theories of Bundling and their Policy Implications in Abuse
Cases: An Assessment in the Light of the Microsoft Case, 85-121 (U. of Mich., Working
Paper No. 33, 2004).
74. Commission Decision No. 72/457/EEC, o.J. L 299/51 (1972) (Commercial
Solvents); Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano and Commercial Solvents v. Commission,
Case 6/73, [1974] E.C.R. 223.
75. Commercial Solvents, [1974] E.C.R. 2033,
19.
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("MI"), the U.S. firm Commercial Solvents ("CS") had a monopoly.7 6 On market for product 2 ("M2"), that firm was facing
competition.7 7 The firms active on that secondary market obtained their supply from CS. More profit could be made by the
dominant firm if these firms were eliminated. To that effect, CS
increased the prices on MI. 7 8 As a result of that price increase,
the cost to carry out an M2 independent activity became progressively unbearable.7 9 Later, CS even discontinued the supply to
these firms located on the secondary market-thereby making
that M2 independent activity impossible. 0
The case gave rise to a decision by the European Commission, which was confirmed by the ECJ. s ' These institutions ruled
that Article 82 EC was violated.8 2 For them, a firm dominating a
market may not extend that domination on derived markets by
using to that effect a/the competitive advantage which contrib83
uted to the creation of dominance on the primary market.
The legal standard established in Commercial Solvents had a
76. Id.
9-12. That monopoly was factual. The firm was the only one able to
manufacture the product on an industrial scale. There were significant entry barriers:
investments were required for the production and know how was necessary to master
the process.
77. See id.
13.
78. See id.
16.
79. Id. 1 34.
80. Id. 1 25.
81. At that time, the decisions adopted by the Commission were challenged before
the ECJ directly. The situation changed with the creation of the CFI, which was granted
the competence to rule on applications by natural and legal persons against acts addressed to them or concerning them directly and individually. The judgments issued by
the CFI may be reviewed, on appeal, by the ECJ.
82. Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano and Commercial Solvents v. Commission,
Case 6/73, [1974] E.C.R. 2033, 11 44-45.
83. See id. 1 25.
[A]n undertaking being in a dominant position as regards the production of
raw material and therefore able to control the supply to manufacturers of derivatives, cannot, just because it decides to start manufacturing these derivatives (in competition with its former customers) act in such a way as to eliminate their competition which in the case in question, would amount to eliminating one of the principal manufacturers of [product 2] in the common
market.... [A]n undertaking which has a dominant position in the market in
raw materials and which, with the object of reserving such raw material for
manufacturing its own derivatives, refuses to supply a customer, which is itself
a manufacturer of these derivatives, and therefore risks eliminating all competition on the part of this customer, is abusing its dominant position within the
meaning of article [82].
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central role from Magill onwards in IP/competition cases.8 4 In
principle, it requires two markets. An M1 must be dominated by
a firm.85 That domination must be used in an unacceptable
manner on an M2. 86 The importance of that two-market structure was emphasized in IMS Health, where an independent firm
was seeking the right to use a brick structure developed by a
dominant undertaking. That brick structure was perceived as
necessary to commercialize health related data. The ECJ ruled
that "it is determinative8 7 that two different stages of production
be identified and that they be interconnected, inasmuch as the
upstream product is indispensable for the supply of the down88
stream product.
That precedent was applied in various cases, including Magill 9 where broadcasting was the basic activity. The firms later
found dominant were preparing documents ("listings") to announce their programs to the public. 0 These documents were
published daily or weekly. Daily: the listings were communicated, the day before, to newspapers, for presentation. Weekly:
each broadcaster published every week, on an individual basis,
their own programs, for the week to come.9" A dispute arose
because another publisher wanted to propose a weekly, comprehensive, TV guide: an independent TV guide announcing all
programs meant for broadcasting during the week in the territories concerned.9 2
84. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
85. See Commercial Solvents, [1974] E.C.R. 2033
25.
86. Id.
87. See id. (for the application of the legal standard established in Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano and Commercial Solvents v. Commission).
88. IMS Health & Co. OHG v. NDC Health GmbH & Co. KG, Case 418/01, [2004]
E.C.R. 5039, 45 (internal citation added).
89. See Commission Decision No. 89/205/EEC, O.J. L 78/43 (1988) [hereinafter
Magill Decision]. In Magill, the Commission did not explicitly refer to Commercial Solvents. However, it used the terms contained in that case. The CFI adopted the same
approach in RTE, Case T-69/89, [1991] E.C.R. 485, 73 and Independent Television Publications Ltd v. Commission, Case T-76/89, [1991] E.C.R. 575,
58. The ECJ was more
explicit: the ruling quotes CommercialSolvents and confirms, thereby, the importance of
that precedent in the solution given to the case. See RTE II, Joined Cases 241-42/91,
[1995] E.C.R. 743, 1 56.
90. Date and hour of broadcasting, presentation of actors, photos etc.
91. The weekly publication was deemed useful because, apparently, viewers often
schedule their activities for the week in function of TV programs.
92. There were also daily announcements through newspapers. However, these announcements served different purposes. Possible viewers need to know in advance what
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In that case, two markets or ranges of markets were considered:
" The primary markets. These markets corresponded to the
production of weekly listings by the broadcasters. The
weekly listings prepared by each broadcaster were regarded as forming a separate market. These listings were
protected by copyrights.9"
* The derived markets. These markets corresponded to the
publication of the said listings. In that range of activities,
one market was the daily publication of listings.94Another
was the weekly publication of these documents.
Each broadcaster dominated a primary market: the market corresponding to its own listings.9 5 The broadcasters were also present on a secondary market: the market for the weekly publication of listings. They opposed the publication of these listings in
a new, independent and comprehensive weekly guide. Thereby,
they protected their activities on the secondary market. Thus,
that behavior could be analyzed as an abuse under the standard
established in Commercial Solvents.9 6

B. The New Product Requirement
Another justification formulated by the European instances
to explain their intervention is the negative effect produced by
illegitimate IP related behavior on the possible emergence of
new products (New Product Requirement, NP requirement)."
That argument was raised for the first time in Magill, where the
opposition by broadcasters to the publication of listings resulted
in a weekly, comprehensive guide being prevented from emerg98
ing.
The emergence of the requirement appeared, originally, as
an element susceptible of restoring coherence in the field of
programs are broadcasted during the week. To that effect, they purchase weekly TV
guides. The two sorts of products are not substitutable with regards to demand.
93. The copyright was granted by national legislation: UK Copyright Act of 1956
and the Irish Law on Copyright of 1963. Magill, O.J. L 78/43, at 8-9 (1988).
94. Id. at 20.
95. Id.
96. In the next Part, we examine the application of the LDP prohibition to other
IP/competition cases, including Microsoft Corp., Case T-201/04, [2007] 5 C.M.L.R. 11.
48.
97. RTE, Case T-69/89, [1991] E.C.R. 485,
98. Id. 1 73.
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IP.9 9 IP is regulated by legislation at national or European levels.
As do all pieces of legislation, these instruments seek a certain
equilibrium between various, sometimes contradictory, objectives. The equilibrium reached in that context was perceived as
being threatened by the emerging jurisprudence, which gave
precedence to competition."' That threat was deactivated by
the emerging principle. 1 ' The reasoning, on that point, was as
follows. IP encourages innovation. Under the NP requirement,
IP protection may be suspended where its exercise would prevent the emergence of further innovation. 0 2 In that line of reasoning, competition law appears as a useful complement bringing a legitimate correction to principles enshrined in IP law.
The existence and the importance of the NP requirement
were confirmed in IMS Health, where the ECJ stressed that no
access related obligation could be imposed on IP dominant
firms where third parties "essentially ...

intend" on duplicating

the products made by that firm. 10 Pursuant to the judgment,
obligations should be confined to situations where "new products or services not offered by the owner of the intellectual property right" would be provided. 0 4 The interpretation of the relation between IP and competition was confirmed. Under IMS
Health, competition may not be given priority where a duplication is envisaged.'0 5 It may be given full effect where the use of
IP would impede further innovation. The purpose thus remains,
in all situations, the promotion of innovation, with a correction
0 6
brought by competition to IP protection where necessary.'
C. Competition on the Derived Market
A third justification present in the jurisprudence is that,
where they prevent access to an M1 IP-protected item necessary
for an M2 activity, dominant firms do not permit competition to
unfold "on the merits" on that derived market. That position is
99. See Taylor, supra note 12 at 100-01.
100. Id.
101. RTE, [1991] E.C.R. 485, 48.
102. See id.
103. See IMS Health & Co. OHG v. NDC Health GmbH & Co. KG, Case 418/01,
[2004] E.C.R. 5039, 49.
104. See id.
105. Id. 1 33.
106. In the next Section, we examine the application of the NPR justification in
other IP/competition cases, including Microsoft.
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founded on the idea that, in a competitive process, products
should be compared on the basis of intrinsic qualities. Under
the jurisprudence, that requirement is not fulfilled where a
product is chosen for features not related to it but rather attached to another item(s).
For instance, the Commission and the CFI refer, in
Microsoft, to independent market surveys demonstrating that, in
the perception of clients, the WGS operating system commercialized by Microsoft was inferior, with regards to quality, to competing products.' °7 Yet, that operating system was attracting progressively more clients.' °8 According to the Commission and the
CFI, the product made by Microsoft was not selected, in that situation, for alleged intrinsic qualities.' 0 9 It was chosen because
other products were not interoperable." 0 In turn, that lack of
interoperability was due to the refusal, by Microsoft, to communicate interoperability information.' 1 1 Thus, the "cause" explaining the success encountered by Microsoft's product on the
relevant market was, for the Commission and the CFI, the re2
fusal, by that dominant firm, to transmit essential information. "
One reason explaining the "product-per-product" perspective" 3' may be a desire to protect consumers. For the European
courts, consumers should not be compelled to purchase products which, in their perception, are inferior in quality. They
should be granted real choices and have true opportunities to
select products corresponding best to their needs. As it appears
from the cases examined above, that liberty is impaired, in the
107. Microsoft Corp. v. Commission, Case T-201/04, [2007] 5 C.M.L.R. 11,
108. See id. 1173.
109. See id. 985.
110. See id.

3.

149.

111. See id.
112. See id. 407. The Commission and the CFI adopted the same attitude with
regards to the second complaint addressed in the Microsoft case. In that second complaint, Microsoft was challenged for "bundling" its media software, Windows Multimedia, with its client PC operating system, Windows. The result of that combination
was that Windows could not be purchased without Windows Multimedia. As Windows is
present on ninety percent of the client PCs worldwide, the market share of Windows
Multimedia grew exponentially. For the Commission and the CFI, that growth could
not be explained, again, by intrinsic qualities allegedly attached to Windows Multimedia. It was rather due to the worldwide ubiquity of Windows as a client PC operating system. See id. 945.
113. This term is used by the author according to its meaning in trade usage.
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perception of these courts, where a domination held on a primary market is used to impose a derived product.
Another perception could be that competition will not lead
to efficiency outside a "product-per-product" perspective.
Through competition, authorities establish the conditions for a
good production at the lowest possible prices. For the European
courts, that result cannot be achieved where products are supported by other items on dominated markets.
Another value possibly involved is that competitors should
be treated fairly. Where a domination is leveraged, competitors
have no real chance of competing successively.' 1 4 Does that imply that "weaker" competitors should be assisted? In Microsoft,
the need to protect competitors was mentioned.1 15 However, it
was not presented as a value legitimate in itself. For the Commission and the CFI, a protection is only legitimate if, and to the
extent, absent a fair access, competition would not unfold satis16
factorily.'
D. Consumer Welfare
A last justification is that IP should not create situations not
favorable to consumers. In Magill, the Commission calculated
that, to obtain information on all available TV programs, consumers had to pay more in the system created by the broadcasters than if a comprehensive guide had emerged. For the Commission, that situation could not be accepted." 7 A specific concern for consumers also appears in Microsoft where, on the basis
of business surveys, the CFI underlined an alleged difference in
quality existing between Microsoft's products and items proposed by competitors." 8 In other passages, that jurisdiction in114. See Microsoft Corp. v. Commission, Case T-201/04, [2007] 5 C.M.L.R. 11,
390, 421.
115. See id. 1 780.
116. See id. 1 643.
117. Magill, O.J. L 78/43, at 23 (1988); see Tom Skinner, Magill: Consumer Interests
Prevail, 6 E.B.L. REV. 90, 90-92 (1995). For a critical view, see Josef Drexl, IMS Health
and Trinko-Antitrust Placebo for Consumers Instead of Sound Economics in Refusal-to-Deal
Cases, 35 IIC: INr'L R. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 778, 788-808 (2004).
118. See Microsoft, [2007] 5 C.M.L.R. 11,
652. The Court noted that:
The limitation . . . placed on consumer choice is all the more damaging to

consumers because . . . they consider that non-Microsoft work-group server
operating systems are better than Windows work-group server operating systems with respect to a series of features to which they attach great importance,

508

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 32:489

dicates the necessity of a competitive environment where consumers have real choices between competing products.1 1 9 For
the CFI, this implies an intervention where real choices disappear as a result of dominant firms reserving markets for themselves. 1

20

These references to consumers are the object of a controversy in antitrust policy. 21 Should the rules of competition improve the situation of consumers? Or should a more general
satisfaction be sought after (general welfare)? This paper is not
the place to examine the specific place of consumers in the application of the rules of competition. From a legal point of view,
the important matter is the indication, by the European courts,
that consumers may-and should-be granted special attention
in IP/competition cases.
IV. PROBLEMS
We have examined IP/competition cases, we have analyzed
their scope and we have investigated the justifications presented
by the European Commission and the European courts. We now
indicate problems that may need to be solved for the emerging
jurisprudence to gain in credibility.
A. Effect on Innovation
The first problem is whether the jurisprudence reaches the
objective it is supposed to attain. Competition policy is expected
to increase efficiency. That objective entails, among others, the
promotion of innovation. Is that result achieved with the jurisprudence? Considering the case law, one has the impression
that innovative firms are placed in front of an equation: "the
better you innovate, the higher the risk you will have to share the
results of your innovation."
such as "reliability/availability of the . . . system" and "security included with
the server operating system."
Id.
653, 656, 662.
119. See id.
120. See Commission Decision No. COMP/C/-3/37.792, O.J. L 32/23, at 25-26
(2004) [hereinafter Microsoft Decision] ("[Owing] to the lack of interoperability that
competing work group server operating system products can achieve with the Windows
domain architecture, an increasing number of consumers are locked into a homogeneous Windows solution at the level of work group server operating systems.") The previous statement is taken over by the CFI in its judgment. Id. 650.
121. See, e.g., Commission Notice, O.J. C 3/2, at 4 (2001).
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Firms are "price-takers" on competitive markets. 122 In principle, they charge prices corresponding to costs.' 23 One way for
firms to bypass that situation is to innovate. By developing new
products or processes, 1 24 they acquire a certain autonomy allowing them to recoup investment and make a profit. However,
competitive advantages only last the time necessary for competitors to adapt. The latter may react by "copying" the innovation.
This is not permissible where products and/or processes are IP
protected. Then, competitors must develop alternative products
or processes. In the struggle for survival on markets, the best
advantages are those which cannot be copied and for which no
realistic alternative exists.
On that basis, two scenarios may be envisaged. First scenario: a firm manufactures a product which cannot be copied or
duplicated. The prohibition on copying and the impossibility of
duplication have, as a result, that the market corresponding to
that product only sells one item: the product coming out of the
innovation. As a consequence, the firm manufacturing the
product is dominant under Article 82 EC. 125 The way is paved
for the imposition of access related obligations.
The second possible scenario is that a firm manufactures a
product which can be copied and/or duplicated. As a result of
these possibilities, alternatives are or become available. The
firm, thus, is not alone on the relevant market. Absent exceptional circumstances, it will not be found dominant. The conseof its efforts.
quence is that the firm may exploit freely the fruits
1 26
No Article 82 EC obligations will be imposed.
122. On competitive markets, firms do not set their prices in full autonomy. Their
decisions are constrained by markets. They have no specific influence on the prices
charged on these markets.
123. On a competitive market: if a firm charges a higher price then consumers
shift to cheaper suppliers. If it charges lower prices, it is selling at a loss. In that context, the right business decision is to set the price at the level of the cost (hoping that
competitors have the same costs).
124. Through the improvement of their processes, firms can increase their productivity. They can also improve the quality of their products. See generally Commission
Notice, O.J. C 3/2 (2001); Commission Notice, OJ. C 101/2 (2004).
125. See EUROPEAN COMMISSION DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR COMPETITION, DiscusSION PAPER ON THE APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 82 OF THE TREATY TO EXCLUSIONARY ABUSES

9-15 (2005).
126. That advantage will last a limited period-the time for competitors to copy
the innovation or duplicate it. During that period, the firm enjoys the fruit of its innovation. Afterwards, it may conserve the "first mover advantage:" the advantage accruing
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As appears from the jurisprudence, firms are encouraged to
innovate. However, that encouragement is limited as a result of
the limitation imposed in the name of competition. Firms benefit from their investment where their innovations may be copied
or duplicated. 127 If they create non-reproducible products, they
run the risk of being submitted to demanding legal obligations.
Thus, path-breaking innovations are not really encouraged: inprogress so far that
novations which push economic or technical
1 28
available.
readily
not
are
duplications
V. INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
Currently, it is hardly possible, unfortunately, to determine,
on a scientific basis, in all circumstances, whether innovation
should be promoted through competition or IP protection. To
a major extent, the issue is still solved through political compromises. Hence the second problem: who should decide? In
most democracies, these compromises are negotiated within Parliaments. Representatives debate whether more freedom and/or
protection is needed. Yet, the compromise is made, in the cases
analyzed here, by judges (CFI, ECJ), and by an executive body
(Commission). Do these organs have the power to do so?
Technically, the jurisprudence is based on the rules of competition. The legal basis is the EC Treaty under which the Commission may apply the rules of competition, 121 the CFI may rule
on individual applications against decisions issued by the Commission in competition matters1 3 ' and the ECJ may review CFI
judgments1 3 1 and/or provide preliminary interpretations or asfrom the fact of being the first undertaking to propose the product or the service concerned.
127. Microsoft Corp. v. Commission, Case T-201/04, [2007] 5 C.M.L.R. 111, 111.
128. See Josef Drexl, The Relationship Between Legal Exclusivity and Economic Market
Power-Links and Limits, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, MARKET POWER AND THE PUBLIC
INTEREST 13-33 (Govaere & Ullrich eds., 2008). For the author, IP law provides a protection against unauthorized imitations but does not have as its object to help firms
acquire significant market power. That idea is not under critique in this article. In this
section, our remark is that, under current EC case law, there is a trend to define IP
relevant markets narrowly-so narrowly that virtually all IP firms may be considered
dominant. If that trend was confirmed, that European attitude may have an adverse
effect on innovation as many-virtually all-innovators could be compelled to share
access to their inventions.

129. EC Treaty, supra note 7, art. 85, O.J. C 321 E/37, at 76.
130. See id. arts. 225, 230, O.J. C 321 E/37, at 143, 146.
131. See id. art. 225, O.J. C 321 E/37, at 143.
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sessments of validity. 13 2 These provisions provide a formal basis
for an intervention of these courts in IP matters.
Another perspective may be adopted: a perspective focused
on the substance of the intervention. That perspective indicates
how far reaching the intervention of the European courts is in
the field of IP. It also raises the question whether these interven-

tions are adequate given the institutional architecture of the European Union.
In most courts, IP is regulated at the national level.13 In
the cases analyzed above, the firms acted in conformity with
these national rules. 134 By stating that these firms abused a dominant position, the European courts suggested that these laws
were not in conformity with the EC Treaty. 13 5 The cases are
presented as directed against behavior. In fact, they concern leg13 6
islation-the laws regulating IP at national level.
Does the Commission have the power to rule, in a decision
based on the rules of competition, that a national legislation is
not compatible with the rules of competition? In our view, the
more appropriate procedure would be, in such a situation, the
initiation, by that institution, of an Article 226 EC procedure
against the Member State(s) concerned." 7
132. See id. art. 234, O.J. C 321 E/37, at 147.
133. See generally TRI-rrON, supra note 2.
134. In Microsoft, the question was also asked whether an intervention would comply with EC secondary law. See generally Council Directive 91/250/EEC, O.J. L 122
(1991); Microsoft Corp. v. Commission, Case T-201/04, [2007] 5 C.M.L.R. 11,
227.
The compatibility with international law was also envisaged. See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v.
Commission, Case T-201/04, [2007] 5 C.M.L.R. 11, 1 777.
135. Microsoft, [2007] 5 C.M.L.R. 11,
36-50.
136. Traditionally, national IP laws are analyzed under EC internal market rules.
In that context, they are normally considered to hinder prima facie the free movement
of goods. A derogation is explicitly provided in Article 30 of the EC Treaty. EC Treaty,
supra note 7, art. 30, O.J. C 321 E/37, at 53. The jurisprudence analyzed has given the
European Commission and the European courts an opportunity to go beyond the compatibility deriving from that derogation-and declare that, although they comply with
the internal market, the use which is made of IP rights may conflict, under exceptional
circumstances, with objectives enshrined in competition law. In the jurisprudence, see
Deutsche Grammophon v. Metro, Case 78/70, [1971] E.C.R. 487. In Renault (Consorzio
Italiano Della Componentistica Di Ricambio Per Autoveicoli v. R4gie Nationale Des
Usines Renault), the ECJ first analyzes the compatibility, with internal market rules, of
the national legislation on design protection. Renault, Case 53/87, [1988] E.C.R. 6039,
1 9-13. The analysis under EC Treaty Article 82 comes in a second stage. EC Treaty,
supra note 7, art. 82, O.J. C 321 E/37, at 74-75.
137. On these issues, see generally KOEN LENAERTS, DIRK ARTS AND IGNACE MASELIS,
PROCEDURAL LAw OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (2d ed. 2006); HENRY G. SCHERMERS AND
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How about the European courts? Pursuant to the EC
Treaty, the ECJ has the power to decide that a piece of national
legislation does not conform with EC law. Normally, these rulings take place in the Article 226 EC procedures mentioned in
the previous paragraph.' 3 8 With the time passing, preliminary
procedures in interpretation also provided opportunities to address the compatibility of national legislation. In these procedures, the ECJ is not supposed to take an attitude on compatibility. It is invited to interpret EC provisions in the context described by the national court raising questions-a context which
includes the existence of a national legislation.'
A related question is whether the ECJ has the power to rule
that a national legislation does not conform to the EC rules on
competition, particularly Article 82 EC. In other words: does
that provision support a finding of incompatibility regarding legislation? That provision is addressed to undertakings, but it has
consequences on behavior adopted by authorities. Under the
case law, national authorities must refrain from behavior affect40
ing the useful effect of these rules.1
The same remarks can be made for situations where IP
rights are regulated at a European level. The Commission may
find that that European regulation is not in conformity with the
EC Treaty. What would be the best process to express that position? Probably not the adoption of a decision on the basis of the
rules of competition. In application of the EC Treaty, the most
appropriate process would be for the Commission to challenge,
before the ECJ, the validity of the European regulation, within
the timeframe set by the Treaty to that effect.14 '
DENIS F. WAELBROECK, JUDICIAL PROTECTION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 309 (6th ed.
2001).
138. See, e.g., Commission v. France, Case C-389/05 (ECJ Oct. 27, 2005) (not yet
reported); Commission v. Italy, Case C-157/06 (ECJ Oct. 2, 2008) (not yet reported).
139. These procedures involve an intervention by the ECJ at the exclusion of the
CFI. Currently, thatjurisdiction does not have the power to adopt rulings in Article 226
or Article 234 EC procedures.
140. EC Treaty, supra note 7, art. 10, O.J. C 321 E/37, at 47.
141. Id. art. 230, O.J. C 321 E/37, at 146. In Microsoft, the question arose whether
Directive 91/250 is compatible with Article 82 EC. Microsoft Corp. v. Commission, Case
T-201/04, [2007] 5 C.M.L.R. 11,
227. The Court held:
[W]hat is at issue in the present case is a decision adopted in application of
Art. 82 EC, a provision of higher rank than Directive 91/250. The question in
the present case is not so much whether the concept of interoperability in the
contested decision is consistent with the concept envisaged in that directive as
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A. Leverage of a Dominant Position ("LDP")

The third problem is whether the justifications raised by the
European courts are acceptable with regards to their technical
construction. Among these justifications is the prohibition on
leveraging a dominant position. That justification is very dependent upon market definition. Defining markets is never easyalways questionable. Take Magill as an example. Magill shows
how difficult it was for EC courts to define the relevant markets.
The issue of market definition was never addressed "head on" in
any of the instruments adopted in the case-instruments which,
14 2
on that point, contain contradictions.
Another difficulty is the apparent necessity of two markets.
Yet, several cases involve one market only. For instance, two
markets were distinguished in Microsoft: the client PC operating
systems (Ml) and the WGS operating systems (M2).' 4 3 For the
Commission and the CFI, Microsoft withheld information on its
client PC operating system (Ml).1 "

That information was

whether the Commission correctly determined the degree of interoperability
that should be attainable in the light of the objectives of Art. 82 EC.
Id. The CFI suggests that one should not verify the consistency between the application
given by the Commission to Article 82 EC in the case at issue and the directive adopted
by the European Parliament and the Council on software protection. This comes down
to asserting that the Commission does not need to take into account EC secondary law
where interpreting the rules of competition-the implicit consequence being that these
rules may be applied in a way which is not consistent with EC legislation. In the context
of trade unions, the ECj ruled that competition courts and authorities applying the
rules of competition must take into account other EC Treaty provisions to avoid results
inconsistent with these latter provisions. A possible inconsistency with EC legislation
has not been addressed yet. In the passage quoted above, the CFI hints that; in such a
situation, it would rule in favor of the instrument applying the rules of competition.
For instance: an Article 82 EC decision issued by the Commission would prevail on an
harmonization directive adopted by the European Parliament and the Council. That
position is not acceptable. A competition law decision does not have the force of the
EC Treaty provision it is supposed to implement. The conflict opposes a decision issued by the Commission and a directive adopted by the European Parliament and the
Council-that latter instrument also purporting to implement an EC Treaty provision.
To our knowledge, there is no certainty as to how a conflict of that nature should be
solved. In our view, the intervention of the Parliament implies that, as regards political
legitimacy, the directive must be deemed superior.
142. Magill, O.J. L 78/43, at
20 (1988). For instance: the individual listings
prepared by each broadcaster constituted, for the ECJ, separate primary markets. By
contrast, these listings together formed one secondary market where they were published.
143. Microsoft Corp., [2007] 5 C.M.L.R. 11,
485.
144. Id. 353.
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needed to design interoperable operating systems on M2.' 45 In
short: the U.S. firm kept secret M1 information to support M2
activities.' 46 That analysis complies with the standard established

in Commercial Solvents. However, Microsoft went further than
withholding MI information. It also kept confidential essential
M2 data. 1 47 Thus, Microsoft withheld Ml and M2 information to
protect M2 activities.14 Does Commercial Solvents support a prohibition to leverage a dominant position where the protected activities are located on the same market? Is leveraging compatible with one-market situations?
The issue is also present in Volvo and Renault, where the ECJ
did not refer to Commercial Solvents. Would the facts support an
application of the legal standard established in that case? The
difficulty is that Volvo and Renault do not feature two marketsonly one. 49 As a reminder, a car constructor refused, in these
cases, to grant a license for the independent import or
fabrication of body panels. 5 ° There was no vertical division of
activities or markets, one being indispensable for the provision
of the other.
An intermediate situation is featured in IMS Health, where a
brick structure was used to sell health-related data. Following
Commercial Solvents, the ECJ stressed, in that case, that two
markets were needed to apply the standard. Could the brick
structure be regarded as a separate market? Could it be separated from the health-related data it was meant to contain? For
the ECJ, a market can be defined separately where a specific demand exists for the product concerned. In this case, there was a
demand for the use of the brick structure on the part of the
competitor at the origin of the litigation. That brick structure
could thus be considered separately.
IMS Health has in common with Volvo and Renault that these
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. 1 280. As explained above, work group servers ("WGS") operating systems
can only work in communities if they can be connected to client PCs and other existing
WGS operating systems. Yet, the WGS operating system common at that time was developed by Microsoft. To develop their own systems, independent manufacturers needed
interoperability information.
148. See id. 353.
149. See generally AB Volvo v. Erik Veng (UK) Ltd., Case 238/87, [1988) E.C.R.
6211; Renault, Case 53/87, [1988] E.C.R. 6039.
150. See generally Volvo, [1988] E.C.R. 6211; Renault, [1988] E.C.R. 6039.
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cases concern products with a form and a content. A form: a
brick structure in IMS Health, 5 ' a design in Volvo and Renault.'5 2
A content: health-related data in the former, 5 3 body panels in
the latter. 154 We have seen that, as a result of the position
adopted by the ECJ, IMS Health could be interpreted as involving
two markets: one for the brick structure (form), another one for
the health-related data (content). Can Volvo and Renault be interpreted along the same lines? If so, can these cases be understood as encompassing two markets: one for the design used in
connection with the body panels, and one for the body panels
themselves.
We would then escape the one market leveraging situation,
which makes it difficult to use the LDP doctrine. But what
would we have envisaged then, outside showing ad absurdum that
market definition can often be manipulated? We would also
have confirmed the trend that IP/competition markets are limited to IP protected products. In substance, this comes down to
stating that each IP right forms a separate market-and that the
firm holding that right is dominant.1 5 5
B. The New Product Requirement ("NP Requirement")
Another important justification relates to the New Product
Requirement ("NPR"). In section 3 (Justifications), we have explained how that requirement brought relief as it suggested that
dominant IP firms would not be compelled to share their rights
in all circumstances-only where a refusal would prevent the further development of innovation by third parties.
That idea was challenged in Microsoft, where the NPR was
analyzed in two stages. 15 6 In a first stage, the CFI submitted that
the requirement is not a general condition to fulfill in all IP/
151. IMS Health & Co. OHG v. NDC Health GmbH & Co. KG, Case 418/01,
[2004] E.C.R. 5039.
152. See Volvo, [1988] E.C.R. 6211, Renault, [19881 E.C.R. 6039.
153. See IMS Health, [2004] E.C.R. 5039.
154. See Volvo, [1988] E.C.R. 6211, Renault, [1988] E.C.R. 6039.
155. See supra Part II and accompanying text ("The Scope of the jurisprudence")
for analysis of the scope of the jurisprudence as regards the undertakings concerned.
156. See Microsoft Corp. v. Commission, Case T-201/04, [2007] 5 C.M.L.R. 11,
647. We concentrate on the CFI judgment. The IMS Health ruling was issued by the
ECJ after the Commission adopted its decision in Microsoft. As a result, the Commission
could not integrate, in that decision, possible changes introduced in IMS Health.
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competition cases. 157 For the CFI, the requirement was introduced to address particular problems arising in specific cases.' 58
Outside these cases, one would not have to verify whether, in the
absence of access, innovation would be curbed.
In a second stage, the CFI examined whether, if the NP requirement was confirmed as a general condition, the circumstances of the case would support a finding that, in specie, that
condition was fulfilled. 159 In the judgment, these circumstances
are analyzed as follows. As appears from available information,
third parties could design adequate WGS operating systems if
they were communicated interoperability data.1 6 ° Supposing
that they would be communicated, these data would be implemented by software developers.1 6 ' Thus, the products made by
Microsoft would not be merely duplicated.' 6 2
Would this be sufficient to consider that these products are
new under the NP requirement? In IMS Health, the ECJ excluded the application of Article 82 EC where the "intention" of
third parties is, "essentially," to "duplicate" products made by the
dominant firm.' 6" In Microsoft, independent software manufac157. Id.
158. See id.
159. See id. 632 (envisaging the two possibilities makes it possible for the CFI to
endure a critical analysis by the ECJ-without incurring the risk of an annulment of its
judgment. Where the CFI has erred on a point but a rectification would not change the
final solution given to a case, the CFI judgment is not annulled in its entirety. Only the
paragraphs containing the errors are declared void).
160. See id. 633.
161. Id. (the crucial element in the demonstration is thus the difference between
specification and implementation). On that point, the demonstration is taken over by
the CFI from the decision adopted by the Commission. For the Commission, "[a] specification is a description of what the software product must achieve, whereas the implementation relates to the actual code that will run on the computer." Id. 24.
162. Id. 640. Software developers would have no interest in a mere duplication.
Clients would not be attracted by offers proposing implementations identical to those
made by Microsoft. Moreover, duplication would not be feasible technically. Specifications do not contain information about how they should be implemented. On the basis
of communicated specifications, developers would not be able to identify the codes
used by Microsoft for implementation. New implementations would have to be created.
163. See IMS Health & Co. OHG v. NDC Health GmbH & Co. KG, Case 418/01,
[2004] E.C.R. 5039, 49. The Court held that:
[T]he refusal by an undertaking in a dominant position to allow access to a
product protected by an intellectual property right, where that product is indispensable for operating on a secondary market, may be regarded as abusive
only where the undertaking which requested the license does not intend to
limit itself essentially to duplicating the goods or services already offered on
the secondary market by the owner of the intellectual property right, but in-

2009]

THE LIMITATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

517

turers would develop WGS operating systems "similar" to those
made by Microsoft. 1 64 The implementations would differ-but
the operating systems developed with these implementations
would have the same function 165 and would thus form part of
the same market.
Are the standards established in these two cases compatible
with each other or has Microsoft altered IMS Health (supposing
that a CFI judgment may change an ECJ standard)? The answer
possibly lies in IMS Health itself. In that case, the ECJ ruled, in
conclusion to a preliminary question, that access may be compelled, in IP/competition cases, where "new" items would be
proposed by third parties "on the market for the supply of the
data in question.
This indicates that "new" products can
form part of the same market as those made by the dominant
firm. In other words: the presence of products made by third
parties on the same market as those made by the dominant firm
does not impede the qualification of these products as being
"new" under the NP requirement.
Thus, products must be new under the NP' requirement for
access-related obligations to be imposed in an IP/competition
context in application of Article 82 EC-but the innovation does
not need to be of such a nature that these "new" products
should belong to another market. This corresponds to the interpretation proposed by the CFI in Microsoft where, as a reminder,
the WGS operating systems made by competitors would belong
to the same market as those made by Microsoft although their
specifications would be implemented differently.'6 7 The conclusion is that the NP requirement is not interpreted differently in
the two cases. Put another way, IMS Health may be interpreted
in a way compatible with the CFI judgment in Microsoft-and
vice versa.
tends to produce new goods or services not offered by the owner of the right
and for which there is a potential consumer demand.
Id.
164. See Microsoft Corp. v. Commission, Case T-201/04, [2007] 5 C.M.L.R. 11,
129.
165. See id. (organization of interactions on community networks).
166. See IMS Health [2004] E.C.R. 5039, 52 (access may be compelled where "the
undertaking which requested the license intends to offer, on the market for the supply
of the data in question, new products or services not offered by the owner of the intellectual property right and for which there is a potential consumer demand.").
167. See Microsoft, [2007] 5 C.M.L.R. 11,
129.
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Does that suggest that the NP requirement does not raise
any difficulty? An already mentioned problem is that, after
Microsoft, the existence of the requirement is uncertain. Does it

still exist as a specific requirement applicable to IP/competition
cases? Or does it embody the Article 82 EC condition that technical development may not be limited by dominant firms to the
detriment of consumers?
Another problem is how the requirement should be inter-

preted, supposing that it remains in existence. May products be
considered new under the requirement where they are commercialized on the same market as those made by the dominant
firm? If so, what is the value of that requirement? As a reminder, that requirement seemed introduced to justify the IP/
competition jurisprudence. The justification was that competition should be reintroduced where IP would prevent further innovation. In the interpretation proposed by the CFI, the degree
of innovation requested for the application of access obligations
is limited. 6 ' These innovations do not need to affect the function of the product.' 6 9
C. Unstable Construction

So far we have concentrated on technicalities-but have we
investigated the solidity of the construction? The IP/competition jurisprudence tells a limited number of cases, five in total:
Volvo, Renault, Magill, IMS Health, and Microsoft. Among these
332, 335.
168. See id.
169. Id. If the function was affected, the product would belong to another market.
Access may be compelled where the product would be sold on the same market. This
entails that the innovation likely to be brought by third parties does not need to be
significant for Article 82 EC to apply. Final problem. Is the interpretation proposed by
the CFI compatible with earlier case law? In Magill, the secondary market included all
weekly guides. The comprehensive guide contemplated by the independent publisher
belonged to the same market as the individual publications supplied by the broadcasters. The presence of these products on the same market was not perceived as an obstacle to the application of the provision. The interpretation seems less compatible with
Volvo and Renault. In these cases, the ECJ prohibited dominant firms from refusing to
grant licenses where that refusal was "arbitrary." There was no mention, whatsoever, in
these rulings, of a requirement that the license requested by third parties should be
limited to the production of new items. On the contrary: in these cases, the authorization was demanded with, in view, an independent fabrication or import of products
identical to those made by the dominant firm. That difficulty disappears if Volvo and
Renault are interpreted as encompassing two markets after IMS Health as we have proposed in the LDP context. Then, we have indicated that such analysis would demonstrate little-except that market definitions are never easy and always questionable.
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cases, Microsoft is exceptional. It involves an undertaking which,
by its size and influence, can hardly be compared to any other
firm worldwide. These peculiarities are so intense that doubts
may be expressed about the possibility, for the European Commission, or for competitors, to use that case in future IP/competition litigation. It would be so easy, for the firm challenged
under Article 82 EC, to argue, in defense, that it is in a very
different situation.
Three of the remaining cases were decided in preliminary
rulings: Volvo, Renault, and IMS Health. The preliminary procedure has specific features which does not make it the ideal context to assess competition issues. In that procedure, in depth
factual investigations are difficult. The ECJ must rule on facts
provided by the national courts raising the questions. Experience shows that, sometimes, the description and the analysis provided by national courts are not sufficient to permit an excellent
examination of the circumstances. 17 Another drawback: the
preliminary procedure provides limited opportunities for argument exchanges. Parties may submit written observations. But
the debates remain limited compared to those taking place in
cases investigated by the Commission with a review by the CFI
and the ECJ.
Among these preliminary rulings, IMS Health is not easy to
interpret. A problem raised by the case is the definition of the
brick structure as being a separate market. As we have suggested, that approach may pave the way, in substance, for an application of access obligations to just about all IP firms. 1 7 1 Moreover, the ruling does not really limit the scope of the jurisprudence although it was probably supposed to do so. The final
decision, in that case, was that third parties may access IP products to manufacture items belonging to the same market as the
products made by the dominant firm. 17 2 That conclusion lowers
170. See VAN

BAEL AND BELLIS,

supra note 73, at 1171-74.

171. Competitors demand access to IP products. As a result of that demand, IP
products are defined as being separate markets. These IP markets count one firm only:
the innovator of the IP products concerned. Being alone on the relevant market, that
firm may be found dominant. An abuse is established as undesirable effects are observed on derived markets where the IP products are used. The conditions are satisfied
for the imposition of access obligations.
172. IMS Health & Co. OHG v. NDC Health GmbH & Co. KG, Case 418/01,
[2004] E.C.R. 5039, 1 52.
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the threshold for the degree of innovation requested for the application of Article 82 EC.
The other preliminary rulings are Volvo and Renault. As we
have indicated, the principle of an IP limitation was affirmed, in
these cases, for the first time. 73 Yet, these cases raise difficulties.
Some of these difficulties were noted in the course of this paper.
First, the two rulings remain, in their substance, relatively
vague. 174 Second, they contain contradictions on important
points.17 Third, they set a demanding standard for IP dominant
firms.176 But, ultimately, they do not apply that standard to the
car constructors involved, although the practices adopted by
these firms seemed to correspond with those listed in that standard. 177 Finally, the position adopted by the ECJ in Volvo and
Renault may be explained, probably, to a certain extent, by the
circumstances of the cases: the IP rights concerned, 17 1 the prod173. They were issued on the same day, they were decided by the same formation
and they include the same principles. For these reasons, they may probably be counted
as forming one case only. See supra notes 4-11 and accompanying text.
174. AB Volvo v. Erik Veng (UK), Case 238/87, [1988] E.C.R. 6211,
9; Renault,
Case 53/87, [1988] E.C.R. 6039. In these rulings, the ECJ states that a refusal to grant a
license may infringe Article 82 EC where it is arbitrary-but it does not indicate under
what circumstances a behavior qualifies as arbitrary. Similarly, the rulings do not provide indications on the circumstances under which royalties become unfair.
175. In Volvo, the ECJ states that IP holders may not be compelled to grant licenses. This would empty these rights of their substance. Yet, the ruling concludes, to
the opposite, that such obligations must sometimes be imposed. In the same vein, the
ECJ rules that IP holders may not be compelled to grant licenses even where significant
royalties are proposed. Yet, the ruling finally entails a prohibition to set royalties at an
unfair level. See Volvo, [1988] E.C.R. 6211,
8-9.
176. See id. 9.
177. Id. 1 10. In those cases, car constructors refused to grant licenses for the
independent production of protected body panels concerned. They also charged, for
these panels, prices significantly higher than those offered by other firms. In the rulings, the ECJ sets a standard under which IP dominant firms may be compelled to grant
licenses at reasonable terms and conditions. The practices adopted by the car constructors seemed to correspond with those aimed at in the standard. We could thus expect
the ECJ to rule that, in the cases at issue, the relevant EC provision had to be interpreted as prohibiting such practices. Yet, the ECJ came to a different conclusion. In
Volvo the court stated "no instance of any such conduct has been mentioned by the
national court." Id. In Renault, as regards the difference in the prices charged by the
dominant manufacturer and independent producers the court stated "a higher price
for the former than for the latter does not necessarily constitute an abuse, since the
proprietor of protective rights in respect of an ornamental design may lawfully call for a
return on the amounts which he has invested in order to perfect the protected design."
Renault, Case 53/87, [1988] E.C.R. 6039,
17.
178. Design was not protected, at that time, in all Member States. Some States
considered that the level of innovation contained in a design was not sufficient to entail
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ucts involved 1 79 and the specific industry"' ° in which these facts
occurred-an industry which has often given raise to antitrust
concerns and where a specific concern exists to protect consumers particularly. 18 '
For these reasons, Magill may be, ultimately, the most important case in the IP/competition jurisprudence. In that case,
three organs1 8 2 had an opportunity to investigate the issue thoroughly. Yet, we have seen how that promising context produced
results not entirely satisfactory. Market definition is essential in
competition litigation. In that case, it was not carried out with
care. As we have seen, this has consequences on the coherence
of the justifications presented by these courts-principally the
LDP and the NP requirement.
a protection. Renault, Case 53/87, Report of the Hearing, [1988] E.C.R. 6048. This may
have been interpreted by the ECJ as implying that the protection granted to design was
excessive in the Member States concerned (Italy, the UK)-and that it should be reduced through an application of the rules of competition. Furthermore, most IP regimes contained compulsory licensing schemes whereby IP firms are compelled to provide licenses in various circumstances. Such schemes did not exist in the national rules
concerning design protection in the Member States where the cases arose. AB Volvo v.
Erik Veng (UK), Case 238/87, Report of the Hearing, [1988] E.C.R. 6214, 6219. In the
rulings, the ECJ may have been tempted to remedy that lacuna by adding that scheme
to these national laws through an application of the rules of competition.
179. Most spare parts used on the vehicles involved in the cases were not subject to
protection. They could be duplicated legally. Volvo, [1988] E.C.R. 6214; Renault,
[1988] E.C.R. 6042. In some States, body panels are not protected because the level of
innovation present in them is not deemed sufficient to permit a protection. This may
have prompted the ECJ to suggest that the protection granted to the car constructor
could not go so far as to allow them to refuse a license or to charge unfair prices.
180. The car industry attracts a special attention on the part of antitrust enforcers.
In the history of EC competition law, a number of cases were decided against car constructors seeking to partition markets. A typical example is the arrangements of distributors with importers to avoid the sale of cars to purchasers likely to resell them on more
expensive markets. The intricacies of the relations among actors in that industry has
prompted the adoption of regulations articulating the conditions to satisfy in order to
qualify for an exemption under Art. 81(3). EC Treaty, supra note 7, art. 81(3), OJ. C
321 E/37, at 73-74. On these regulations, see SIR CHRISTOPHER BELLAMY & GRAHAM
CHILD, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW OP COMPETITION 475-95 (6th ed. 2008); VAN BAEL &
BELLIS, supra note 73, at 350-82; Konrad Schwumm and Hubert Gambs, Motor Vehicles,
in THE EC LAw OF COMPETITION 1649-1701 (Jonathan Faull & Ali Nickpay eds., 2007).
181. A number of arguments raised in the cases against car constructors relate to
consumer protection. For instance: the prices charged for protected spare parts were
apparently set at a level just inferior to the limit where the consumers would renounce
repairing the car. Not only would that strategy lead to higher profits for constructors.
It would also compel consumers to purchase new models whereas, with spare parts
made by independent manufacturers, the ancient vehicles could have been kept for
years. Renault, [1988] E.C.R. 6042, 6045.
182. The European Commission, the CFI, and the ECJ.
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Five cases in total, an exceptional case unlikely to serve as a
precedent or illustration in future IP/competition cases, three
cases decided in a procedure not entirely adequate to rule on
complex competition issues, one case based on questionable
market definitions: are these solid foundations to regulate innovation?
D. Underlying Attitude
Last but not least, we examine whether the position adopted
by the European courts finds an echo in other rulings, or other
instruments, adopted in other competition law areas, or even
other fields of law.
Of course, an association coming to mind is with cases involving "essential facilities."' 8 3 These cases are the object of a
controversy. The debate is whether a general principle compels
firms to give access to facilities placed under their control where
these facilities are essential for the provision of derived services.
Typically, providers present on secondary markets claim that
they were refused access to an infrastructure, that the terms/
conditions imposed for access were not reasonable or that these
terms/conditions were discriminatory.
That jurisprudence has inspired regulations adopted in network markets-particularly to markets concerning electronic
communications.' 8 4 As in essential facility cases, these industries
feature infrastructure through which services are provided. In
both contexts, the issues are similar: was access provided under
reasonable and nondiscriminatory conditions?"8 5
In these rulings and regulations, courts and authorities
grant a special attention to effects produced, on derived mar183. Much has been written about essential facilities. See, e.g., Ulf Muller & Anselm
Rodenhausen, The Rise and Fall of the EssentialFacilityDoctrine, 29(5) EuR. COMM. L. REv.
310 (2008); see a/soJohn Temple Lang, DefiningLegitimate Competition: Companies' Duties
to Supply Competitors and Access to Essential Facilities, in INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST LAW
AND POLICY, 245, 245-99 (Barry Hawk ed., Fordham Corporate Law Institute 1995). For
an comparative analysis of latest developments, see Damien Gdradin, Limiting the Scope
of Article 82 EC: What can the EU Learnfrom the US Supreme Court'sJudgment in Trinko in
the Wake of Microsoft and Deutsche Telekomm?, 41 COMMON MKT. L. Riv. 1519, 151923 (2004).
184. PIERRE LAROUCHE, COMPETITION LAW AND REGULATION IN EUROPEAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS 1-36 (Hart 2000); see generally NIHOUL & RODFoRD, supra note 71.
185. See LAROUCHE, supra note 184 at 218-31.
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18 6
kets, by operation, or behavior, located on primary markets.
These instruments concern activities taking place at various
levels in an economic chain. A feature specific to them is that a
product resulting from one activity (primary market) is analyzed
as being necessary for a second activity.
The attention to "derived effects" is not limited to these specific situations. Often, activities are integrated in economic
chains. As a result, competition analysis may not be limited to
concerns raised on markets where the operation/practice in
question take place. It must extend to negative consequences
possibly affecting other markets-which, depending on the situations, may be located downwards, or upwards, along the chain

("spillover effects")."7

Another association is, within IP law, to the "exhaustion of
right" principle. Under that principle, an IP firm may only use
its rights once. 8 It is not allowed to oppose the use of an IP
product by a third party once that product has been legally put
in commerce. In other words: firms may use IP rights oncebut may not benefit from these rights a second time.18 9
This may be the final word-and the ultimate explanation
for the attitude adopted in the IP/competition jurisprudence.
In all these situations, successful firms are allowed to enjoy the
advantages they derive from property rights: intellectual property, property on infrastructure or essential facilities. But these
advantages may only be enjoyed once. The fruit may not be
reaped, a second time, on a derived product market1 9" or another geographic market.1 9 '
CONCLUSION
In this Article, we have examined cases where the European
186. See id. at 129-64.
187. See VAN BAEL & BELLIS, supra note 73, 906-07.
188. See id. at 589-90.
189. In the jurisprudence, see, Deutsche Grammophon v. Metro, Case 78/70, [1971]
E.C.R. 487 (sound recordings); Centrafarm v. Sterling Drug, Case 15/74, [1974] E.C.R.
1147 (patents); Centrafarm v. Winthrop, Case 16/74 [1974] E.C.R. 1183 (trademarks);
Keurkoop v. Nancy Kean Gifts, Case 144/81 [1982] E.C.R. 2853 (design rights). In the
literature, see Bellamy & Child, supra note 180 at 820-22; Kevin Coates, Lars Kjolbye &
Luc Peeperkorn, IntellectualProperty, in THE EC LAW OF COMPETITION 10.36-10.57 (Faull
and Nickpay eds., 2007); VAN BAEL & BELLIS, supra note 73, 589-90.
190. IP/competifion cases, essential facility cases, network regulation.
191. Exhaustion of IP rights.
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Commission and the European courts envisage two mechanisms
to support innovation: competition and IP protection. The
question is when, and where, one mechanism should be preferred to the other. For the Commission and the courts, the answer lies in the degree of competition existing on markets.
Where competition is effective, IP can be protected. 92 By contrast, it should be limited where competition is not effective.
In that jurisprudence, innovation remains protected. However, the form of that protection differs depending on the degree of competition. On competitive markets, the substance of
an IP right remains a prerogative to oppose unauthorized uses.
Where competition is not effective, IP becomes a financial right:
the right to claim a compensation for the use of the innovation
under reasonable and non discriminatory terms and conditions.
Currently, there does not appear to exist any sanctuary
against the application of competition. This is a tough lesson for
undertakings enjoying a certain protection provided by law. In
the last decades, rights traditionally attached to public utilities
were dismantled in the name of competition. The next field
may be IP: a form of market organization that is not limited to a
specific industry but runs across economic boundaries.

192. Firms then compete on the basis of their respective innovations as protected
by IP rights.

